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DISCUSSION

THIS AFTERNOON I WOULD LIKE TO FIRST OFFER SOME SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE TWO PAPERS BY PAUL SEABURY AND ELIOT COHEN, AND THEN OFFER A FEW OBSERVATIONS OF MY OWN BEYOND THOSE RELATED TO THE PAPERS.

I WOULD LIKE TO DIVIDE MY COMMENTS INTO THREE CATEGORIES ADDRESSED BY BOTH OF THE AUTHORS: (1) THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ANALYST AND THE POLICYMAKER; (2) ANALYST BACKGROUND RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING; AND (3) INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS.

FIRST, THE ANALYST AND THE POLICYMAKER. PAUL SEABURY SAYS, "INTELLIGENCE SHOULD NOT CRAVE, FOR ITSELF, A PURISTIC, ALOOF, INDEPENDENCE AKIN TO 'ACADEMIC FREEDOM.'" I COULD NOT AGREE MORE. THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IS TO SUPPORT THE POLICY PROCESS, NOT TO APPROACH ISSUES AS THOUGH INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS WERE MEN FROM MARS OR SOME KIND OF TOTALLY INDEPENDENT ARBITRATORS. BY THE SAME TOKEN, SUPPORT FOR THE POLICYMAKER ALSO MEANS ON A FAIRLY REGULAR BASIS TELLING THEM THINGS THEY DO NOT WANT TO HEAR. I RECALL DURING THE BRIEF TENURE OF JIM

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SCHLESINGER AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE HEARING VIVIDLY ONE TIME HIS COMPLAINT THAT PEOPLE AT CIA HAD FORGOTTEN THAT THEY WORK FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THIS IS A IMPORTANT AND ELEMENTARY FACT THAT DIFFERENTIATES INTELLIGENCE FROM ACADEME. IN FACT, UNLESS INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ARE DOWN IN THE TRENCHES WITH THE POLICYMAKER, UNDERSTAND THE ISSUES, KNOW WHAT U.S. OBJECTIVES ARE, HOW THE PROCESS GOES ON, AND WHO THE PEOPLE ARE, WE CANNOT POSSIBLY PROVIDE EITHER RELEVANT OR TIMELY INTELLIGENCE THAT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO BETTER INFORMED DECISIONS.

I HAVE SPOKEN OF THE SIGNIFICANT DEGREE OF AUTOMONY OF CIA AND PAUL HAS SOME CONCERNS ABOUT THAT. AUTOMONY IN THE SENSE I INTEND IS POSITIVE IN THE RESPECT THAT THE AGENCY'S ANALYSIS IS NOT SUBORDINATE TO THE PAROCHIAL VIEWS OF ONE OR ANOTHER POLICY DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AUTONOMY IS A NEGATIVE FEATURE IF IT IMPLIES SOMEHOW BEING ALOOF OR APART FROM THE POLICY PROCESS AND THOSE WHO SEEK INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT.

A FINAL AND RELATED POINT ON ANALYST-POLICYMAKER RELATIONSHIPS. I AM SYMPATHETIC TO MR. COHEN'S CONCERN OVER THE CONCEPT OF "NO-FAULT" INTELLIGENCE -- THAT ALL OF OUR PROBLEMS DERIVE FROM FAILURES OF THE POLICYMAKERS OR THE INHERENT DIFFICULTIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS WE ADDRESS. I AGREE WITH MR. COHEN THAT ON SOME IMPORTANT OCCASIONS IN THE

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LAST 25 YEARS, INACCURATE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS HAS EITHER CONTRIBUTED TO FAULTY DECISIONS OR ALLOWED POLICYMAKERS TO CONTINUE ON THEIR WAY WITHOUT HAVING AT LEAST TO DEAL WITH AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE. AND SOME OF THESE INTELLIGENCE SHORTCOMINGS IN THE PAST HAVE BEEN DUE TO INADEQUACIES IN THE WAY WE APPROACHED OUR ANALYSIS AS WELL AS IN THE ANALYSIS ITSELF. IT WAS IN RECOGNITION OF THIS FACT THAT SIGNIFICANT CHANGES WERE MADE IN THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE, BOTH IN ORGANIZATION AND IN ITS APPROACH TO ANALYSIS IN THE EARLY 1980S.

II

WITH RESPECT TO BACKGROUND, RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING, LET ME FIRST ACKNOWLEDGE MR. COHEN'S POINT ABOUT THE LARGE NUMBER OF RELATIVELY NEW ANALYSTS, PRIMARILY IN CIA BUT IN OTHER AGENCIES AS WELL. THE FACT IS THAT NEARLY HALF THE ANALYSTS IN CIA HAVE LESS THAN 5 TO 10 YEARS' EXPERIENCE. THE EXODUS OF OFFICERS FROM THE CLANDESTINE SERVICE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1970S HAS BEEN WIDELY COMMENTED UPON. WHAT IS LESS WELL KNOWN IS THAT AT LEAST AS HIGH A PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE LEFT THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE DURING THAT PERIOD. THERE ARE THREE REASONS FOR THIS. FIRST, THIS EXODUS MARKED THE NATURAL DEPARTURE OF A GENERATION OF OFFICERS IN BOTH DIRECTORATES WHO HAD BEGUN THEIR CAREERS IN THE LATE 40S OR EARLY 50S, AND HAD SIMPLY COMPLETED A CAREER. SECOND, IN THE LATE 1970S THE

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GOVERNMENT MADE IT EXCEPTIONALLY ATTRACTIVE TO RETIRE EARLY. THIRD, AND EQUALLY IMPORTANT, IN MY VIEW, WAS THE FACT THAT MANY IN BOTH DIRECTORATES SIMPLY FOUND THAT AFTER THE TRAVAILS OF THE 70S, THIS BUSINESS WAS NO LONGER MUCH FUN. SO A NUMBER OF NEW ANALYSTS HAD TO BE HIRED SIMPLY TO REPLACE THOSE WHO WERE DEPARTING. ADDITIONALLY, HOWEVER, THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION IN THE SIZE OF THE ANALYTICAL DIRECTORATE DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE 80S.

THE RESULT OF BOTH OF THESE TRENDS IS A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF RELATIVELY NEW ANALYSTS. THE DISADVANTAGE IS OBVIOUS: A GREAT DEAL OF EXPERIENCE AND MEMORY WAS LOST. BUT THERE WAS A GOOD SIDE AS WELL. A LOT OF PEOPLE CAME IN WHO DID NOT CARRY THE BAGGAGE OF THE PAST, INCLUDING OLD FIGHTS WITH OTHER AGENCIES, SCARS FROM OLD WARS WITH POLICYMAKERS, AND WHOSE BACKGROUNDS WERE IN MANY RESPECTS SUPERIOR TO THOSE OF THE PEOPLE THEY REPLACED, IN THE SENSE THERE WAS A GREATER ATTENTION TO HIRING REGIONAL SPECIALISTS AND PEOPLE WITH LANGUAGES.

NOW, ON RECRUITMENT, MR. SEABURY SPEAKS OF THE OVERRELIANCE ON "HIGHLY HOMOGENEOUS, YOUNG, INEXPERIENCED WHITE CAUCASIANS WITH TOP RECORDS OF ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE, COMING FROM NICE GOOD MIDDLE CLASS FAMILIES." I SHARE HIS CONCERN THAT OUR RECRUITMENT TENDS TO BRING US THESE PEOPLE. IN AN ARTICLE CRITICAL OF OUR WORK ON THE SOVIET UNION THAT I WROTE IN 1973,

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I NOTED THAT, "THERE IS A WIDE CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN A COLLEGE-EDUCATED ANALYST IN THE WEST AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP." THE SAME MIGHT BE SAID OF IRANIAN LEADERS, LIBYANS, CHINESE, AND A HOST OF OTHERS. THIS CULTURAL GAP CAN BE OVERCOME IN TWO WAYS; FIRST, BY LOOKING FOR PEOPLE WITH INTENSIVE AREA STUDIES BACKGROUNDS AND FOREIGN LANGUAGE SKILLS WHO HAVE LIVED ABROAD, AND SECOND, BY SUSTAINED IMMERSION IN A COUNTRY OR IN THE STUDY OF A GIVEN COUNTRY OR CULTURE FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD. AND TO THE DEGREE THAT WE ARE UNABLE TO HIRE IMMIGRANTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES AS OUR OWN EMPLOYEES, WE CAN LOOK TO THEM INCREASINGLY FOR ADVICE AND INSIGHT AS WE ANALYZE OTHER COUNTRIES AND CULTURES. WE HAVE BEEN DEFICIENT, IN THIS RESPECT, IN TAKING ADVANTAGE OF EMIGRES AND DEFECTORS. I COMPLETELY AGREE WITH BOTH AUTHORS THAT WE NEED LANGUAGE SKILLS, ANALYSTS WITH A GREAT DEAL OF HISTORY, AND SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER CULTURAL DIVERSITY. I AGREE FURTHER WITH MR. SEABURY THAT THE CADRE OF NOT ONLY U.S. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS, BUT OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS GENERALLY IS TODAY CONSIDERABLY MORE CULTURALLY PAROCHIAL THAN IN THE 1950S. INDEED, ONE MIGHT EVEN SAY THAT SOME OF THOSE WHO WERE INSTRUMENTAL IN ESTABLISHING THE CLANDESTINE SERVICE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN GETTING INTO THE AGENCY TODAY.

NOW LET ME ADDRESS TRAINING. MR. COHEN DRAWS TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT ON A ARTICLE ENTITLED "MANAGING/TEACHING NEW ANALYSTS". MR. COHEN CITES THE ARTICLE AS NOTING THAT THE

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MANAGER'S FIRST TASK IS AKIN TO DEPROGRAMMING -- UNDOING HABITS FORMED IN FOUR TO TEN YEARS OF COLLEGE-LEVEL WORK. WHILE MR. COHEN NOTES THAT THE REMARK SUGGESTS A DISDAIN OR CONTEMPT FOR UNIVERSITIES OF HIGHER EDUCATION, IN FACT, FROM MY PERSPECTIVE, MUCH OF WHAT THE AUTHOR IS ADDRESSING FOCUSES PRECISELY ON SEVERAL OF THE PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED BY MR. SEABURY, WHO OBSERVES THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS NO REASON FOR BEING OTHER THAN THAT OF FURNISHING INFORMATION AND REASONED JUDGMENTS AND ESTIMATES ON WHICH RATIONAL ACTION IS POSSIBLE. HE SAYS IT IS "IN THIS THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DIFFERS GREATLY FROM THE ETHOS OF THE ACADEMY". HE ALSO OBSERVES THAT THE CRAFT HAS NO OTHER JUSTIFICATION THAN ITS CHARGE TO FURNISH POLICYMAKERS WITH WHAT IS NEEDED TO TAKE PURPOSIVE ACTION. THERE ARE THREE AREAS WHERE ACADEMIC TRAINING MUST BE COUNTERED: (1) IN MAKING THE ANALYST UNDERSTAND THAT BREVITY IS CRITICAL (IN CONTRAST TO GRADUATE STUDIES); (2) THE AMASSING OF DETAIL WITHOUT PRESENTING A CLEAR LINE OF ANALYSIS AND DRAWING CLEAR CONCLUSIONS THAT INCLUDE ALTERNATIVES; AND (3) ENSURING RELEVANCE AND TIMELINESS SO THAT PURPOSIVE ACTION IS POSSIBLE OR ENABLED.

I COULD NOT AGREE MORE WITH BOTH AUTHORS AS SUGGESTED ABOVE THAT TRAINING OR EDUCATION IN THE INTERPRETATION OF FOREIGN CULTURES IS CRITICAL. MR. COHEN CITES ABE SHULSKY THAT THE PROBLEM OF PENETRATING ANOTHER GOVERNMENT'S WORKINGS DOES NOT RESEMBLE THE CHALLENGE OF UNRAVELLING "A HIDDEN BUT ULTIMATELY

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KNOWABLE PROCESS OF NATURE" BUT RATHER IS "A STRUGGLE BETWEEN TWO HUMAN INTELLIGENCES, EACH OF WHICH IS TRYING TO OUTPSYCH THE OTHER." I CONCEDE THE POINT THAT IN THE PAST INTELLIGENCE MANAGERS HAVE "PLACED LITTLE VALUE ON THE IDEA THAT PEOPLES OF OTHER CULTURES HAVE DIFFERENT HABITS OF THOUGHT, DIFFERENT VALUES AND DIFFERENT MOTIVATIONS" AND "APPARENTLY REJECT THE IDEA THAT SOMEONE WHO PRESUMABLY HAS AN INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCES HAS ANY PARTICULAR USEFULNESS." BUT THAT VIEW, TO THE DEGREE THAT IT EVER EXISTED, AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED IS A THING OF THE PAST. CITING AGAIN THE ARTICLE THAT I WROTE IN 1973, I SAID, "THE FACT REMAINS THAT OUR PERCEPTION OF SITUATIONS IS PROBABLY WIDELY DIVERGENT FROM THE KREMLIN'S PERCEPTION" AND "THE SOVIET UNION IS A STRANGE AND IDEOSYNCRATIC POLITY, NOT TO BE UNDERSTOOD OR DEALT WITH WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE CONSCIOUS EFFORT" AND "OFTEN, EVEN THAT IS NOT ENOUGH." I ADDED THAT "AN ANALYST TRYING TO UNDERSTAND THE MENTALITY OF THE SOVIET LEADERS OR THEIR APPROACH TO OR PERCEPTION OF PROBLEMS IS SERIOUSLY HANDICAPPED WITHOUT BACKGROUND IN SOVIET HISTORY AND, IN PARTICULAR, RUSSIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE. THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING THIS RUSSIAN HERITAGE AND ANALYZING PRESENT SOVIET THINKING AND BEHAVIOR CAN HARDLY BE OVEREMPHASIZED. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT FUTURE ANALYSTS HAVE TRAINING IN RUSSIAN AND SOVIET HISTORY AND CULTURE. ANALYSTS NOW IN PLACE WITHOUT SUCH TRAINING SHOULD BE SENT TO SCHOOL TO ACQUIRE IT." I WAS A FAIRLY LONELY VOICE ARGUING THAT IN 1973, AT A

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TIME WHEN I WAS THE ONLY PERSON IN MY UNIT ANALYZING SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY WITH AN ACADEMIC BACKGROUND IN RUSSIAN HISTORY. MY FIRST BRANCH CHIEF WAS AN EXPERT ON THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE SECOND WAS AN EXPERT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA. I AM HAPPY TO SAY THAT BECAUSE OF CHANGES IN POLICIES IN THE LATE 1970S AND EARLY 80S THIS SITUATION HAS CHANGED DRAMATICALLY, AND THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF SPECIALISTS WITH TRAINING AND AREA BACKGROUNDS IN EACH OF THE REGIONAL OFFICES OF THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE.

I BELIEVE IT IS THE LACK OF REGIONAL EXPERTISE THAT CONTRIBUTES TO MIRROR-IMAGING. I BELIEVE THIS PROBLEM IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS DIMINISHED IN RECENT YEARS, IN PART BECAUSE OF A CHANGE IN HIRING PRACTICES AND IN THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE, INCLUDING SUPERVISORS, WHO HAVE AREA EXPERTISE AND EXPERIENCE. LET ME CONCLUDE ON THIS POINT BY SIMPLY SAYING THAT I ACCEPT TOTALLY MR. COHEN'S EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTING THE "OTHERNESS OF THE ENEMY".

LET ME CONCLUDE ON THIS ISSUE OF TRAINING AND EDUCATION OF ANALYSTS IN THE 1990S WITH TWO POINTS. FIRST, FRITZ ERMARTH LIKES TO DIVIDE WHAT WE DON'T KNOW INTO TWO CATEGORIES: SECRETS AND MYSTERIES. SECRETS ARE THOSE THINGS, TO USE MR. COHEN'S REFERENCE, SUCH AS THE PHYSICS UNDERLYING A SOVIET BARRAGE ATTACK THAT ARE POTENTIALLY KNOWABLE -- THAT IS, FACTS -- ABOUT WEAPONS SYSTEMS, ABOUT PLANS, ETC. MYSTERIES, AGAIN TO USE MR. COHEN'S REFERENCE, HAVE TO DO WITH THE

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INTERPRETATION OF FOREIGN CULTURES, HAVE TO DO WITH THAT STRUGGLE BETWEEN TWO HUMAN INTELLIGENCES, EACH TRYING TO OUTPSYCH THE OTHER. IN THE LATTER, THERE ARE NO CLEAR-CUT ANSWERS, OFTEN BECAUSE THE OTHER LEADERS THEMSELVES DO NOT KNOW WHAT THEY ARE GOING TO DO OR HAVE NOT WORKED OUT THEIR PROBLEMS. HERE WE MUST HELP THE POLICYMAKER TRY TO UNDERSTAND THE THOUGHT PROCESSES INVOLVED, THE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THAT CULTURE, AND THE ALTERNATIVES THAT ARE OPEN TO THEM, ALONG WITH OUR BEST ESTIMATE AS TO WHICH THEY ARE LIKELY TO CHOOSE.

THE SECOND POINT IS THAT WE HAVE TAKEN A NUMBER OF STEPS TO TRY AND DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF AREA BACKGROUND AND LANGUAGES DESCRIBED IN MR. COHEN'S AND MR. SEABURY'S PAPERS. IN AN IDEAL WORLD, EVERY POLITICAL ANALYST WE HIRE WOULD HAVE SPECIALIZED AREA BACKGROUND AND KNOWLEDGE AND ONE OR MORE FOREIGN LANGUAGES AS USABLE TOOLS. IN THE REAL WORLD OF AMERICAN EDUCATION AND PEOPLE WHO CAN MEET OUR SECURITY QUALIFICATIONS, WE CANNOT DO THAT WELL. BUT BETWEEN 40% AND HALF OF THOSE WE HIRE AS POLITICAL ANALYSTS DO MEET THESE SUBSTANTIVE QUALIFICATIONS, AND WE TRY TO GIVE OTHERS THE ADDITIONAL EDUCATION SO THAT THEY CAN DO SO AS WELL. FOR EXAMPLE, OVER THE YEARS WE HAVE SENT A NUMBER OF PEOPLE TO CHINESE STUDIES PROGRAMS, BOTH FOR LANGUAGE AND HISTORY. WE ALSO TRY TO EDUCATE OUR ANALYSTS TO DEAL WITH PROBLEMS NOT ADDRESSED IN UNIVERSITIES; FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE A DECEPTION ANALYSIS COURSE ON THE TECHNIQUES AND PRACTICES ON

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DECEPTION AND ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGIES FOR IDENTIFYING IT. FOR SOME TWO YEARS WE HAVE BEEN TEACHING A SEMINAR ON INTELLIGENCE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES -- A NEED MR. COHEN IDENTIFIES -- THAT ADDRESSES CASE STUDIES PREPARED TO ILLUSTRATE CAUSES OF INTELLIGENCE FAILURES AND HOW TO ENCOURAGE MORE EFFECTIVE ANALYSIS. IT IS, I MIGHT ADD, ONE OF OUR MOST POPULAR COURSES. AND WE HAVE ADDED OTHER COURSES AS WELL IN AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF FOREIGN CULTURES AND, IF YOU WILL, ADD "GROUND TRUTH" TO OUR ANALYSTS' VIEWS.

LET ME CLOSE MY DISCUSSION OF THE AUTHORS' VIEWS ON RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING WITH SEVERAL OBSERVATIONS, BEGINNING WITH MR. SEABURY'S REFERENCE TO ANGELO CODEVILLA'S PAPER SEVERAL YEARS AGO DISCUSSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF EMPIRICISM IN OUR CULTURE AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS MUST COMBINE AN EXAMINATION OF EMPIRICAL FACTORS WITH THE RANGE OF OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, INCLUDING NOT ONLY EMOTION AND COMMITMENT, BUT ALSO HISTORY AND LOGIC AND MOTIVE. IN THOSE AREAS WHERE OUR EMPIRICAL INFORMATION IS AMBIGUOUS OR EVEN ABSENT, THERE IS ALWAYS THE DANGER IN ANALYSIS OF SAYING THAT BECAUSE NO ONE HEARD THE TREE FALL, IT MUST NOT HAVE FALLEN. WHEN THE QUESTION OF A COUNTRY'S INVOLVEMENT IN ONE OR ANOTHER ACTIVITY ARISES, AND THE INFORMATION IS SCANTY, WE HAVE TO BE WILLING TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT NATION'S PAST BEHAVIOR, WHETHER OR NOT THAT NATION HAD A MOTIVE FOR SUCH ACTIVITY, AND WHETHER SUCH AN ACTIVITY

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WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH OR A LOGICAL EXTENSION OF THAT NATION'S POLICIES OR OTHER ACTIVITIES. I COULDN'T AGREE MORE THAT WE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NON-EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

SECOND, I STRONGLY AGREE WITH MR. COHEN THAT "PREDICTIONS WHICH BEGIN WITH CONCLUSIONS WILL CARRY LITTLE WEIGHT WITH STATESMEN, PARTICULARLY IN AREAS WHERE THEY RATE THEIR OWN EXPERTISE HIGHLY." I BELIEVE THAT AN ANALYST MUST BUILD A CASE REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE PROJECT. HE MUST BRING TOGETHER BOTH THE EMPIRICAL DATA AND SUBJECTIVE CONSIDERATIONS IN DESCRIBING EVENTS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE OR POLICIES AS THEY HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED. IT IS ONLY IF THE ANALYST, THROUGH THIS, ESTABLISHES A PERSUASIVE BASE OF ARGUMENTATION -- A CASE, IF YOU WILL -- CAN HE THEN BRING THE READER ALONG WHEN HE BEGINS TO SPECULATE AND PREDICT THE FUTURE. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT AN ANALYST HAS TO PERSUADE THE POLICYMAKER THAT THE ANALYST KNOWS WHAT HE IS TALKING ABOUT AND HAS MASTERED THE MATERIAL AND UNDERSTANDS THE CULTURE HE IS DEALING WITH BEFORE HE WILL HAVE ANY CREDIBILITY WHEN HE BEGINS TO PROJECT THE FUTURE. ABOVE ALL, I BELIEVE THAT PARTICULARLY WHILE IN DEALING WITH SO-CALLED MYSTERIES WE HAVE TO ADDRESS ALTERNATIVE WAYS THAT EVENTS MAY DEVELOP, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ALWAYS OWES THE POLICYMAKER A CLEAR-CUT, BEST ESTIMATE. WE ARE NOT PAID NECESSARILY TO SIMPLY PROVIDE AN ARRAY OF ALTERNATIVES AND FACTS. THE POLICYMAKER WANTS TO HAVE SOME SENSE OF WHAT WE THINK WILL HAPPEN. WE SIMPLY NEED TO BE HONEST WITH THE

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POLICYMAKER AS TO THE QUALITY OF OUR EVIDENCE AND THE DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE WE HAVE IN OUR JUDGMENTS.

THIRD, THE ANALYTICAL COMMUNITY HAS BEEN LISTENING TO ITS CRITICS ON THE OUTSIDE FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS NOW. HIGH PRIORITY IS ATTACHED TO HIRING ANALYSTS WHO HAVE LIVED ABROAD, WHO HAVE AREA EXPERTISE AND FOREIGN LANGUAGES, WHO KNOW OF THE HISTORY AND THE CULTURE OF THE AREA IN WHICH THEY ARE GOING TO WORK. HIGH PRIORITY IS ATTACHED TO DEVELOPING EXTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH EXPERTS IN THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY AND THINK TANKS AND BUSINESS IN ORDER TO HAVE PEOPLE CHALLENGE THE ANALYSTS' VIEWS AND BRING OTHER INFORMATION AND PERSPECTIVES TO BEAR ON THE PROBLEM. PROBLEMS OF DECEPTION AND DENIAL THANKS IN SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE TO THE EFFORTS OF SEN. WALLOP AND ANGELO CODEVILLA HAVE BECOME AN ACCEPTED PART OF COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF ISSUES, AND A GROWING NUMBER OF ANALYSTS THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNITY HAVE TAKEN THE COURSE IN DECEPTION ANALYSIS SO THAT IT BECOMES A PART OF THEIR ANALYTICAL ARSENAL. WE ARE WORKING TO BREAK DOWN THE BUREAUCRATIC BARRIERS IN HAVING AN EXPERT BE ABLE TO REMAIN IN POSITION FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD OF TIME AND STILL BE REWARDED AND PROMOTED. THESE AND OTHER CHANGES PROCEED AT A DIFFERENT PACE. BUT SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN MOST OF THEM. THE PRESSURE HAS TO BE KEPT ON TO AVOID BUREAUCRATIC TENDENCIES FROM RETAKING NOW ABANDONED BEACHHEADS. IT IS A CONSTANT STRUGGLE.

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III

THE SUBJECT BOTH AUTHORS HAVE BEEN ASKED TO ADDRESS IS INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1990S. BOTH HAVE FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON THE KINDS OF ANALYSTS THAT WILL BE REQUIRED IN TERMS OF EDUCATION, TRAINING, APPROACH TO ANALYSIS, ETC. BOTH FOCUS ESPECIALLY ON THE REQUIREMENT FOR ANALYSTS FAMILIAR WITH FOREIGN AND, SHALL WE SAY, ALIEN CULTURES. THERE IS LITTLE FOCUS IN EITHER PAPER ON SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS. LET ME ADDRESS WHAT THEY DO SAY AND THEN MAKE A FEW OBSERVATIONS OF MY OWN.

FIRST, PAUL FOCUSES ESPECIALLY ON THE REQUIREMENT FOR ANALYSTS WHO CAN SEE INTERCONNECTIONS AMONG WIDELY GEOGRAPHICALLY SEPARATED TRENDS AND EVENTS. ONE OF THE DISADVANTAGES OF A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR ANALYSIS IS THAT IT TENDS TO MAKE THE IDENTIFICATION OF SUCH INTERCONNECTIONS MORE DIFFICULT. IT WAS IN RECOGNITION OF THIS THAT WE CREATED SEVERAL ORGANIZATIONS TO TRY TO BRIDGE THESE REGIONAL PATTERNS. WE CREATED THE INSURGENCY AND INSTABILITY CENTER IN AN EFFORT TO TRY AND EXAMINE THE NATURE OF INSURGENCIES ACROSS THE ENTIRE WORLD, INCLUDING THEIR FOREIGN SUPPORT. WE ALSO CREATED AN ORGANIZATION DEALING WITH SUBVERSION WORLDWIDE, SO THAT WE COULD TRACK PATTERNS, PARTICULARLY OF SOVIET, CUBAN, AND LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES OR SPONSORSHIP

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OF INSURGENCIES, PROPAGANDA, ETC. SO WE HAVE TRIED TO ESTABLISH SOME CONNECTIVE TISSUE THAT WILL ENABLE US TO ADDRESS WHAT I WOULD CALL TRANS-REGIONAL PROBLEMS, SUCH AS THOSE ALLUDED TO BY MR. SEABURY. IN THIS REGARD, I PERSONALLY BELIEVE THAT ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ASSETS WE HAVE IS OUR CONTACT WITH ACADEMICIANS, PEOPLE FROM THINK TANKS, ETC. IT IS OFTEN PEOPLE DOING THIS KIND OF INDEPENDENT RESEARCH THAT CAN GIVE US THE INSIGHTS OR WHAT I WOULD CALL THE MACRO-ANALYSIS THAT AT LEAST POINTS US IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION IN TERMS OF IDENTIFYING SOME OF THESE INTERCONNECTIONS. I WOULD SAY THAT THAT WAS TRUE, FOR EXAMPLE, AT LEAST TO A DEGREE WITH RESPECT TO TERRORISM AND SOVIET SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM BACK IN THE EARLY 1980S.

I THINK THAT MR. COHEN, HOWEVER, HAS PUT HIS FINGER ON A LARGER ISSUE WITH RESPECT TO REQUIREMENTS IN THE 90S THAT I WILL ADDRESS VERY BRIEFLY, BUT WHICH IS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT. HE NOTES IN HIS PAPER THAT "HENCEFORTH THE UNITED STATES WILL NO LONGER HAVE THE LUXURY OF CONCENTRATING ITS INTELLIGENCE ASSETS OVERWHELMINGLY ON ITS CHIEF TARGET, THE SOVIET UNION". HE THEN POINTS TO A NUMBER OF OTHER PROBLEMS THAT ARE CERTAIN TO BECOME SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES. I NOT ONLY AGREE WITH HIM, I WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT THIS TREND BEGAN SEVERAL YEARS AGO. WE NOW HAVE SOMETHING ON THE ORDER OF 50% OF THE ASSETS OF THE COMMUNITY FOCUSED ON THE SOVIET PROBLEM. MY PRINCIPAL WORRY FOR THE 90S IS THAT THE ABSENCE OF INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE

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AND PRIORITIES FROM THE MOST SENIOR LEVELS OF THE POLICY COMMUNITY AND THE WHITE HOUSE WILL RESULT IN A CONTINUED DIFFUSION OF OUR EFFORTS AS WE ARE PUSHED IN THE DIRECTION OF SATISFYING AN INCREASINGLY WIDE RANGE OF AGENCIES ON AN INCREASINGLY WIDE RANGE OF PROBLEMS. I BELIEVE THAT IN ANTICIPATION OF THE 1990S, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ITSELF IS GOING TO BE FORCED TO REEXAMINE ITS PRIORITIES, AND AT SOME POINT INFORM THE POLICY COMMUNITY AND THE CONGRESS THAT IT CAN NO LONGER CARRY OUT AN OPEN-ENDED PROGRAM OF COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ON EVERY CONCEIVABLE SUBJECT OF INTEREST TO THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. BEGINNING WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO IDENTIFY A SERIES OF HARD-CORE ISSUES WHERE WE DEVOTE THE NECESSARY RESOURCES TO WORKING THE PROBLEM SATISFACTORILY, KNOWING IN ADVANCE THAT IT WILL MEAN WITHDRAWING THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT ON SOME AREAS THAT ARE PERIPHERAL TO CENTRAL NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS BUT IMPORTANT TO INFLUENTIAL BUREAUCRATIC AND CONGRESSIONAL CONSTITUENCIES. IDENTIFYING THOSE CENTRAL ISSUES OTHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE A DIFFICULT AND PAINFUL TASK.

LET ME CLOSE WITH A FEW OBSERVATIONS. FIRST, THE ONE AREA IN PAUL SEABURY'S PAPER THAT CAUSED ME SOME CONCERN AND UNCERTAINTY WAS HIS ASSERTION THAT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE 1990S BE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TO ENGAGE IN "ACTIVE" INTELLIGENCE -- THE EXPLOITATION OF OPPORTUNITIES AND PURSUIT OF ACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY GOALS. THIS SOUNDS TO ME LIKE COVERT

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ACTION AND NOT ANALYSIS. TO THE DEGREE IT INVOLVES ANALYSIS, IT MEANS AN AGGRESSIVE APPROACH ON THE PART OF INTELLIGENCE TO DEALING WITH ACTION-ORIENTED PROBLEMS, SUCH AS COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTERNARCOTICS, TECH TRANSFER, IDENTIFYING SOVIET DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA, ETC. BUT I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING PAUL EXPAND ON HIS NOTION OF "INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIVENESS TO POLITICAL TASKINGS OF A POSITIVE AND PERHAPS HIGHLY ADVENTUROUS NATURE AS CONTRASTED WITH POLITICALLY CAUTIOUS AND CONVENTIONAL ONES" IN THE ARENA OF COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS AS OPPOSED TO COVERT ACTION.

SECOND, WHILE I AM A STRONG SUPPORTER OF THE IDEA OF SPECIALIZED AREA TRAINING AND HAVING ANALYSTS WHO NOT ONLY HAVE LIVED IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY, BUT HAVE STUDIED ITS CULTURE AND LANGUAGE AND ARE STEEPED IN ITS HISTORY, I WOULD HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE THAT LONG-TIME REGIONAL EXPERTS ARE OFTEN THE LEAST CAPABLE OF FORECASTING SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL DISCONTINUITIES -- REVOLUTIONS, OR WHATEVER. IT IS AN OFTEN FORGOTTEN FACT THE CIA'S PRINCIPAL ANALYST ON IRAN IN THE LATE 1970S HAD WORKED ON IRAN FOR MANY, MANY YEARS. THAT WAS, IN FACT, IN MY VIEW, PART OF THE PROBLEM. WHILE ON A DAY TO DAY BASIS, AND IN ORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES, A DEEP UNDERSTANDING OF THE OTHER COUNTRY'S CULTURE, POLITICS AND HISTORY WILL HELP IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING AND FORECASTING THEIR REACTIONS AND ACTIONS IN MOST CIRCUMSTANCES, THE FACT IS THAT THE HISTORY OF MOST COUNTRIES IS ONE OF LARGE CONTINUITIES, AND

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THOSE WHO ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE UNDERLYING FOUNDATIONS FOR THAT CONTINUITY OR STABILITY ARE MOST OFTEN THOSE WHO WILL FIND REASONS TO SAY THAT WARNING FLAGS OF INSTABILITY OR SOCIAL PROBLEMS HAVE OCCURRED BEFORE, FIT INTO THE HISTORICAL PATTERN, AND CAN THEREFORE BE DISMISSED. WITHOUT PREJUDGING THE ISSUE, I WOULD POINT TO THE ANALYSIS OF MANY EXPERTS ON MEXICO AS AN EXAMPLE. MAYBE THEY'RE RIGHT; MAYBE NOT. BUT IT IS BY NO MEANS AN ISOLATED SITUATION. IN SHORT, I BELIEVE THERE NEEDS TO BE A COMBINATION OF PEOPLE WITH AREA EXPERTISE AND PEOPLE WHO THINK BROADLY, WHO ASK HARD AND EVEN SOMETIMES SIMPLE QUESTIONS -- THE SEEKING OUT OF THOSE WHO HAVE UNORTHODOX VIEWS OR DEFY THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM TO KEEP TESTING.

THIRD, MR. COHEN MAKES AN OBSERVATION ABOUT THE APPARENT EMPHASIS ON SHORT-TERM ANALYSIS RATHER THAN LONG-TERM RESEARCH PROJECTS. I WOULD SAY THAT THIS WAS A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM UNTIL A FEW YEARS AGO. WITH THE DRAWDOWN IN RESOURCES IN THE 1970S, CIA, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS FORCED TO ABANDON ITS LONGER-RANGE RESEARCH ON SOVIET DEFENSE INDUSTRIES AND ALSO ON THE THIRD WORLD. TODAY'S MAIL ALWAYS HAD TO BE ANSWERED. ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL BENEFITS OF THE SIGNIFICANT NEW RESOURCES IN THE FIRST PART OF THIS DECADE HAS BEEN TO ALLOW US TO ESTABLISH A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR A LONG RANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, WHERE THE RESOURCES ARE PROTECTED FOR CARRYING OUT THESE KINDS OF PROJECTS. FOR EXAMPLE, FOR THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE AT CIA HAS BEEN ABLE TO PRODUCE

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BETWEEN 500 AND 700 MONOGRAPHS ON LONGER-RANGE BASIC RESEARCH ISSUES, MANY OF THEM ON THE THIRD WORLD, SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN DEFENSE INDUSTRIES, AND NEW LONGER-RANGE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE WORLD. THIS HAS BEEN A LONGSTANDING PROBLEM, BUT I WOULD SAY THAT IT IS ONE THAT HAS LARGELY BEEN BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL. MOST ANALYSTS NOW UNDERSTAND THAT AN INABILITY TO PRODUCE LONGER-RANGE RESEARCH PAPERS WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT DELETERIOUS EFFECT ON THEIR CAREERS.

FOURTH AND FINALLY, I WOULD JUST LIKE TO SAY THAT BOB BUTTERWORTH, IN HIS PAPER ON COLLECTION, NOTES THAT COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ARE INSEPARABLE, AND THAT INTELLIGENCE ERRS IN MAKING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN THEM SO GREAT. IN THE ABSTRACT, I WOULD ENDORSE THIS, BUT I WOULD ALSO SAY THAT IN REALITY FROM THE MANAGEMENT STANDPOINT IT IS A DIFFICULT DIVISION TO AVOID -- AS, IN FACT, THIS CONFERENCE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO AVOID IT. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS HAVING MANY BRIDGES THAT CONNECT THESE TWO INTIMATELY RELATED AREAS OF THE BUSINESS.

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